By C. Paul Hallwood, Thomas J. Miceli (auth.)
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Extra info for Maritime Piracy and Its Control: An Economic Analysis
Simple calculations suggest that monetary gains constitute sufficient motivation for most Somalis, given the high return piracy promises relative to legal employment, coupled with the low expected cost of sanctions. Hallwood, C. Paul, and Thomas J. Miceli. Maritime Piracy and Its Control: An Economic Analysis. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. 0008. 0008 Somali Piracy: For the Money or for the Honor? In this chapter we offer an analysis of the motivations for Somali pirates using an economic model of job selection when there is a death risk.
4 An alternative precaution by shippers when confiscation of cargo is the primary objective of pirates involves shippers adjusting their cargo to make it less valuable, for example, by apportioning it into smaller lots. Pirates encountering a target vessel will therefore be less likely to initiate an attack, all else equal. The trade-off is the loss in scale economies in shipping. 0009 Economic Model of Maritime Piracy: Part 1 an attack is negatively related to the expected sanction for any configuration of cargo, this type of ‘self-insurance‘ by shippers actually becomes more viable as third-party enforcement increases because shippers need to adjust their cargo less in order to make it unattractive to pirates.
In addition to income foregone from not working in the non-piracy sector, direct costs will also be incurred. 2) which is also incurred over the period t = 1, ... ,T. 2). 2) is negative, signifying that strictly economic gains—‘the money’—is not large enough to attract recruits into piracy. If that is indeed the case, then something else must be involved as a motivation. This something else involves the perceived political or cultural burdens referred to by Bueger (2013). Thus, Perceived total Estimated net WTP to relieve perceived = + gain from piracy economic gain cultural/political burdens.